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This image on the opening page of this essay graced the front of the
brochure for the Conference Women, Justice, and Authority, held in 2000 at
Yale Law School. l The woman-robed, enthroned, and holding scales and
sword-is one of many images inscribed on glass panels on windows at the law
school. But she did not adorn our brochures because we thought anyone
(including people working in the building) would know her as a local reference.
Unlike many of the funky, enigmatic figures that dot buildings like the Yale
Law School but whose meanings are obscure, this image is easily legible.
Indeed, images like her are ubiquitous, appearing in courthouses and newspaper
cartoons around the United States.2 We-from many different countries-have
learned to recognize this image as the symbol of Justice because we have been
taught to do so by political leaders hoping to link their decisions to justice
itself. 3
The longevity of the link between visual depictions of acts ofjudgment and
female statuary is impressive. That lineage can be traced back to the Egyptian
Goddess Maat and then to the Greek Dike and to the Roman Justicia.4 Well-
preserved deployments can be found beginning in Europe in the Middle Ages,S
and become more frequent after the Reformation. The Cardinal Virtues of
Justice, Temperance, Prudence, and Fortitude (sometimes joined by the
theological virtues of Faith, Hope, and Charity) replaced Catholic images of
Judgment scenes and of saints in public buildings in Northern Europe.6 Swiss
burghers adorned their coats of arms with Justice images,7 and Venetian Doges
put her on the prow of their boat, the Bucintoro, which they used in yearly
pageants.8
Moving forward in time, an early nineteenth century portrait of Queen
Anne of England displays her dressed up as Justice.9 And, today, Justice
images can be found across the United States, from within the halls of the
1. See Women, Justice, & Authority: A Working Conference, April 28-30, 2000 at I (brochure, on
file with author). Co-sponsors included the Yale Departments of Political Science, History, and
Anthropology; the Whitney Humanities Center; the Yale Center for International and Area Studies; the
Arthur Liman Public Interest Program and Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights
at Yale Law School; the Yale Women's and Gender Studies Program; and the Yale American Studies
Program.
2. See also the cover logo of the Yale Journal ojLaw and Feminism.
3. See Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Images ojJustice, 96 YALE L. J. 1727, 1741-49 (1987).
4. Id. at 1729-30.
5. See ADOLF KATZENELLENBOGEN, ALLEGORIES OF THE VIRTUES AND VICES IN MEDIEVAL ART:
FROM EARLY CHRISTIAN TIMES TO THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 28-55 (1939).
6. See Curtis & Resnik, supra note 3, at 1745-47.
7. Id. at 1751.
8. See Canaletto, The '"Bucintoro'" by the Molo on Ascension Day (1729) (painting in Bowes
Museum, Barnard Castle, Durham, England).
9. See Verno, Queen Anne as Justice (c. 1704) (painting in Hampton Court Palace, England),
reproduced in Curtis & Resnik, supra note 3, at 1735.
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Department of Justice in Washington, D.C. to the top of New York City's Hall,
from midwestern statehouse rotundas to a 1998 tapestry made for a new federal
courthouse in Portland, Oregon. lO After Attorney General John Ashcroft
draped a Justice statute in the Great Hall of Justice to hide its bronze breasts, a
spate of cartoons parodied that act. 11 And "Lady Justice" is a regular in
catalogues that market products, such as briefcases and jewelry, for lawyers.
Justice did not always stand alone. Her three Renaissance siblings,
Temperance, Prudence, and Fortitude (each with their own distinctive
attributes) were paired with Justice in thousands of paintings, prints, etchings,
and sculptures over the course of a few hundred years. 12 Sometimes, with
Faith, Hope, and Charity (also depicted by female figures accompanied with
distinctive emblems), they battled the Seven Deadly Vices. 13
Yet references to these other Virtues have been lost to popular culture.
Neither politicians nor retailers would rely on the picture of a woman holding a
bridle (symbolizing the virtue of restraint-to wit, Temperance), a woman
looking in a mirror (to remind one of Prudence), or a woman leaning on a
column with a lion nearby (embodying strength, Fortitude) to convey their
messages. 14 Unlike these and a host of other emblematic images which are
little known but to art historians, Justicia-Justice-in her varied incarnations
remains a stock figure in contemporary buildings and in life. Political leaders
continue to use her, purposefully and didactically, to tell stories about who they
are and what they do.
In this volume dedicated to Women, Justice, and Authority, we can see the
irony of the longstanding association of the female body with Justice.
10. The Art & Architecture Program in the United States provides that a small percentage (typically
.50% of a building's budget) is to be spent on public works of art. See generally 41 C.F.R. § 102.77
(2003). The building of many new courthouses in the federal system has thus prompted several
commissions for public art. Some of the artists chosen have relied on justice iconography. For example,
Judith Poxson Fawkes created a tapestry with a Justice for the Mark O. Hatfield U.S. Courthouse, in
Portland, Oregon. The sculptor Diana Moore has created several installations for U.S. federal
courthouses: "Justice," at the Warren B. Rudman Federal Courthouse Annex, Concord, N.H.; "Head of
Justice," Martin Luther King, Jr. Federal Courthouse, Newark, N.J.; and "Urns of Justice," Federal
Courthouse, Lafayette, LA. Pictures of some of these pieces are available at the United States General
Services Administration (GSA) website, http://hydra.gsa.gov, in the GSA Design Awards section.
II. See. e.g., Don Wright, Editorial Cartoon, NEW HAVEN REGISTER, May 24, 2002, at A6;
Christopher Newton, Justice Department Hangs Drapes in Front of Partially Nude Statues, Assoc.
PRESS, Jan. 29,2002.
12. Compendia of the appropriate emblems for the particular figure were available. See. e.g.,
CESARE RJPA, BAROQUE AND Rococo PICTORIAL IMAGERY (Edward A. Maser ed., Dover Publications
1971) (1593). Many of these images have been preserved. A series of frescoes in the Siena Town Hall
is an oft-cited and much studied example. See N. Rubenstein, Political Ideas in Sienese Art: The
Frescoes by Ambrogio Lorenzetti and Taddeo di Bartolo in the Palazzo Pubblico, 21 J. WARBURG &
COURTAULD INST. 179 (1958); Marianna Jenkins, The Iconography of the Hall of the Consistory in the
Palazzo Pubblico. Siena, 54 ART BULL. 430 (1972); RANDOLPH STARN, AMBROGIO LORENZETTI: THE
PALAZZO PUBBLICO, SIENA (1994).
13. See KATZENELLENBOGEN, supra note 5, at 31-36.
14. See generally HELEN NORTH, FROM MYTH TO ICON: REFLECTIONS OF GREEK ETHICAL
DOCTRINE IN LITERATURE AND ART (1979).
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European traditions depicted Justice as a woman but did not permit women to
be judges. For centuries, the United States followed suit. Further, around the
world, justice systems tolerated injuries done to the female body. Unpleasant
and horrific images of real women-scared, scarred, injured, killed-remind us
of the distance at which law has kept women's safety. A significant source of
justification for legal indifference came from the concept of jurisdiction.
Women's bodies were placed within the domain of households, headed by
males, who if white, had jurisdiction over both the women and children therein.
Today, most legal systems condemn such violence, but they have also
failed to prevent its frequent occurrence. Such violence is often conceived to
be the result of personal interactions rather than of systemic constructions of
the roles of women and men in the social order. As a recent monograph from
the research arm of UNICEF explains, although illegal, violence against
women is often "sanctioned under the garb of cultural practices and norms.,,15
Within the United States, the problem of violence against women has often
been subsumed under the headings of family or criminal law-domains of
governance that some assume to be the province of states. But, just as the
contemporary legibility of the image of Justice illustrates how we can be taught
to make associations, the presumed naturalness of these jurisdictional divides
are also artifacts of education. We have been taught to connect a particular
level of governance with authority over certain kinds of status relationships and
fi f ·· 16orms 0 lllJUry.
Look again at the image of the oddly robed woman with scales and sword
and focus on how peculiar is its contemporary ability to invoke associations to
democratic justice systems. Why do we look at a robed woman with scales and
sword and think "Justice" or "Law"-and not Opera, Greek Statues, or Warrior
Princesses?
In the commentary below, I focus on comparable peculiarities that
disconnect patterns of violence targeted at women from national intervention.
Advocates of women's equality sought to reorient the discussion of violence by
insisting on the stature of the right to be free from violence. They sought to
make the physical safety and dignity of women an element of national
citizenship rights. But they were told that it was jurisdictionally improper in
this federation to seek such recognition. For intervention, they were told to
15. UNICEF, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS (United Nations Children's Fund
Innocenti Research Ctr., Innocenti Digest No.6, 2000), http://www.uniceficdc.org/publications/pdf7
digtest6e/pdf.
16. See. e.g., SUZANNE METTLER, DIVIDING CITIZENS: GENDER AND FEDERALISM IN NEW DEAL
PUBLIC POLICY (1998) (discussing New Deal programs and how national authorities retained more
control over programs conceived to serve workers, presumed to be white men, while states were given
more authority over programs aimed at women of all colors and black men); NANCY F. COIT, PUBLIC
VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION (2000); ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF
EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA
(2001).
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seek aid from local, "domestic" authorities, not from Congress. Just as the
association of a certain statue with Justice is generated through politics, so the
plausibility of jurisdictional divides has been naturalized and now serves to
constrain national powers to respond to women's inequality.
I write about the engendering of state/federal jurisdictional divides not
because I believe that mobilizing national legal mechanisms is the only or
necessarily the most effective method by which to change status relationships.
Indeed, in the United States, local officials have many times been ahead of the
national govenunent in generating rights of personhood. 17 Moreover, local
commitments are always essential to implementation of legal norms. But
national action is also needed. Political decisions at that level both
memorialize and inscribe justice by deeming certain forms of injury to be so
fundamental that they are constitutive of national identity. Today, it would be
"un-American" to prohibit marriages among individuals with differing racial
identities. But that national normative commitment is less than fifty years
01d. 18 Moreover, it took persistent national pressures and the Civil War to
enable African-Americans to be able to marry each other. 19
Below, I detail efforts to enshrine women's physical safety as a similar
national right, in this instance exemplified by creating a "Civil Rights
Remedy,,20 authorizing lawsuits in federal courts against those who physically
harmed plaintiffs because of their gender. The history of the creation and
demise of the Civil Rights Remedy in the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) of 199421 is important to recount and to analyze both because
obtaining the national agreement necessary for passage was difficult and
because that accomplishment survived for only a short time. A bare majority of
the Supreme Court held it unconstitutional-as a breach of jurisdiction.22
Having underscored the energy spent by political leaders to ensure Justicia's
ongoing saliency over several centuries and continents, I turn our collective
gaze to local and national histories of other, assumed-to-be-natural allocations
and attributes of social order, both within families and within the United States.
17. The refusal to enforce federal fugitive slave laws is one famous historical example. See ROBERT
M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975). Recognition of
same-sex marriage is a contemporary one. See 1999 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91 § 2 (providing "eligible
same-sex couples the opportunity to obtain the same benefits and protections afforded by Vermont law
to married opposite-sex couples"). Cf Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 3(a),
110 Stat. 2419,2419 (codified at I U.S.c. § 7 (Supp. V. 1999» (defining marriage as a legal union
between one man and one woman for federal statutes and regulations); id. § 2(a) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
I 738C) (eliminating the requirement that states provide full faith and credit to decisions of other states
that treat same-sex relationships as marriages).
18. See the aptly named Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967).
19. Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation ofAfrican American
Marriages, II YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 251 (1999). See also Katherine M. Franke, Women Imagining
Justice, supra this volume.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
2 I. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994).
22. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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As I discuss, systems of jurisdiction do not serve only to sustain women's
subordination. They also rely-as does the gender/sex system---on
essentializing assumptions, on a claimed naturalness of the divisions inscribed.
But much of what is assumed to be natural in jurisdiction, like much of what is
assumed to be distinctive between women and men, does not find its source in
nature. Rather, people and politics create jurisdiction, and they also shape the
import of gender differences. Moreover, in this polity, the state/federal division
has its own gender coding. "Women's issues" are equated with family life,
which in turn is associated with state authority. Commercial matters and public
life, still seen as male-dominated, are understood to be under national
governance. Supreme Court decisions (such as that refusing congressional
power over violence against women) both reflect and reinforce such
assumptions. But, the maintenance of jurisdictional distinctions that constrain
national powers to reduce the inequality of women and men will (I hope) soon
be understood as peculiar artifacts of an earlier age-just as images of hulking
women with broken columns, pitchers, and mirrors have retreated from view.
II. CLAIMING JUSTICE BY CHANGING THE LEGAL STATUS OF WOMEN'S SAFETY
Many of us in the United States are currently involved in a struggle to
develop national rules of governance to enable women to function with some
measure of equality. The work takes different forms, as we debate the meaning
and promise of equality. One project, shaped by innovative efforts of many
people over the last several decades, seeks to alter the reach of the term "civil
rights" to include reference to the safety of women, whatever their color.
During the second Reconstruction of the 1960s, the federal courts and Congress
played a dominant role in defining various aspects of daily life-the ability to
go to local schools, to vote, to shop or to eat in local stores and restaurants, and
to sleep at hotels of one's choosing-as national rights that could not be
limited by one's race?3
Advocates of equality saw the potential for parallel work on gender.24
Under the leadership of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, they built a sequence of
Supreme Court decisions that recognized women as national rightsholders
23. See. e.g., Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110,79 Stat. 437; Civil Rights Act of 1968
(Title VIII, Fair Housing Act), Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81. See also Brown v. Bd. Of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294 (1964).
24. The interaction is complex between claims of gender and claims of racial equality, in terms of
the overlap and distinctions as social movements and in law. See. e.g., Judith Resnik, Asking About
Gender in Courts, 21 SIGNS 952 (1996) (discussing projects, some framed as about "gender" and others
as about "race and ethnicity," aimed at reducing bias in the courts); Serena Mayeri. "A Common Fate of
Discrimination": Race-Gender Analogies in Legal and Historical Perspective, 110 YALE L.J. 1045
(2001) (looking at how legal arguments have drawn analogies between discrimination based on race and
that based on gender).
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under the Fourteenth Amendment. 25 Subsequently, in the debates in the 1980s
about the propriety of the nomination of Robert Bork to serve on the United
States Supreme Court, women's groups criticized Judge Bork for his view that
the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection did not apply to
women.26 While many factors led to the defeat of his nomination, one was his
refusal to recognize women's equality as a principle of United States
constitutional law. Thereafter, those aspiring to hold national offices saw the
political utility of claiming concern for women's rights, albeit with very
different understandings of its meaning.27
During the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, many people were also at work-in
local, national, and global venues--on the problems of violence against
women. Violence organized women's daily lives by disabling them from
walking fre~ly down streets, working a host of jobs, and feeling safe at home.
Centuries of practices and legal rules had enshrined household violence as
either tolerable or an interpersonal problem (based on idiosyncratic interactions
among two particular individuals) about which law could do little. Equality
advocates therefore aimed at moving the image of violence against women
from the local crime scene to the national stage, so as to mark violence against
women as a systemic expression of women's inequality and subordination.
In the late 1980s and 19905, women's rights advocates thought that
national legislation would be useful to supplement local resources and
remedies. The model of civil rights legislation seemed ready-made, durable,
reiterable. A vocabulary for discussion-already robust and potentially
capacious-appeared appropriate to invoke. Catharine MacKinnon, Victoria
Nourse, Pam Coukas, Lynn Hecht Schafran, and many others (myself included)
participated in helping to shape legislative efforts on behalf of one such
effort,28 the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), first introduced in 19ge9
and enacted by Congress in 1994.30 The legislation had many facets, some
addressing funding of state-based programs against violence, others facilitating
the interstate enforcement of protection orders, and yet others providing access
to federal courts to enforce both civil and criminal remedies. One provision,
25. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See generally LINDA K. KERBER, No
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP (1998); Linda
K. Kerber, Writing Our Own Rare Books, infra this volume.
26. See Nomination ofRobert H. Bark to be Associate Justice ofthe United States Supreme Court:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 1DOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
27. Judith Resnik, Changing Criteria for Judging Judges, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 889 (1990); Judith
Resnik, From the Senate Judiciary Committee to the County Courthouse: The Relevance of Gender,
Race, and Ethnicity to Adjudication, in RACE, GENDER, AND POWER IN AMERICA: THE LEGACY OF THE
HILL-THOMAS HEARINGS (Anita Hill & Emma Coleman Jordan eds.) (1995).
28. See Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violence. Relationship. and Equality Meet: The Violence
Against Women Act's Civil Rights Remedy, II WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. I (1996); Sally Goldfarb, The Civil
Rights Remedy ofthe Violence Against Women Act, 4 J.L. & POL'y 391 (1996) (panel discussion).
29. S. IS, 102dCong. (1991).
30. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stal. 1902 (1994).
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which attracted a great deal of attention, bore the title "Civil Rights Remedy,,31
and, as initially written, permitted victims of crime who had been targeted
because of gender to bring civil actions in federal court against assailants.32
Eligible plaintiffs included those who had been harmed by crimes including
"rape, sexual assault, sexual abuse, abusive sexual contact, or any other crime
of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender.,,33
In many ways, the proposed statute could be understood as both an artifact
of and an effort to implement the Nineteenth Amendment, which in the early
1920s had given women the right to vote. 34 But for women voters, women
employees, women Senate staffers, law students, lawyers, and judges, VAWA
would neither have been proposed nor enacted. And, reflective of the changing
circumstances of women as political actors, women's rights advocates found
support for that statute's passage in state govenunents. State judiciaries had
taken the lead in bringing problems of "gender bias" to awareness through
commissioning official task forces to undertake studies and to file reports.
Dozens of projects provided data about the hurdles that women, seeking safety,
faced because of skeptical police officers, prosecutors, judges, and jurors.35
Attorneys General from more than forty jurisdictions joined in arguing that
national assistance-money, programmatic support, and complementary federal
judicial remedies, both civil and criminal-was needed.36 On the other hand,
some civil liberties groups worried that the increased sanctions against violence
would fall most heavily on men of color and that the benefits would flow more
towards women with economic resources than to those in poorer and more
vulnerable communities.37
31. 42 U.S.c. § 13981 ("[I]t is the purpose of this part to protect the civil rights of victims of
gender motivated violence ...") (1994).
32. See 137 CONGo REc. S1302, 1312 (1991). Title 111, §§ 301(b) and (d), had proposed federal
lawsuits for violations of the right "to be free from crimes of violence motivated by the victim's
gender," defined as "any crime of violence ... including rape, sexual assault, sexual abuse, abusive
sexual contact, or any other crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender"
that would have constituted felony offenses, whether prosecuted or not.
33. !d.
34. See generally Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality,
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REv. 947 (2002).
35. See generally Lynn Hecht Schafran, Gender Bias in the Courts: An Emerging Focus for
Judicial Reform, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 237 (1989); Vicki C. Jackson, Empiricism, Gender, and Legal
Pedagogy: An Experiment in a Federal Courts Seminar at Georgetown University Law Center, 83 GEO.
LJ. 461 (1994); Deborah Hensler & Judith Resnik, Contested Identities: Task Forces on Gender, Race,
and Ethnic Bias and the Obligations of the Legal Profession, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS'
ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000).
36. See Letter from Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York on Behalf of His Colleagues to
Congressman Jack Brooks, Chair of the House Judiciary Committee (July 22, 1993), in Crimes of
Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights ofthe
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103rd Congo 34 (1993). Attorneys general from thirty-nine states, the
District ofColumbia, and Guam supported national assistance.
37. See Jenny Rivera, The Violence Against Women Act and the Construction of Multiple
Consciousness in the Civil Rights and Feminist Movements, 41 J.L. & POL'y 463, 489-91, 498-506
(1996).
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A disturbing aspect of the history of the Civil Rights Remedy in VAWA is
the identity of some of its most vehement opponents: state and federal judges.
These groups are not often associated with active lobbying efforts aimed at
pending legislation.38 But when VAWA was pending, official spokespersons
for state and federal judges advised Congress not to create a broad federal
remedy that would enable women victims of violence to bring suits in federal
court. The chair of the Conference of Chief Justices of the State Courts filed a
statement arguing that, were federal jurisdiction available, women would
manipulate claims to bring ordinary divorce litigation into federal court.39 In
1991, the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court and the federal
judiciary's policymaking body (the Judicial Conference of the United States)
registered opposition to VAWA. As the Chief Justice explained, "[a]lthough
supporting the underlying objective ... to deter violence against women," the
Judicial Conference opposed the Civil Rights Remedy because its definitions
were "so sweeping, that the legislation could involve the federal courts in a host
of domestic relations disputes.,,4o Further, the federal judiciary relied on
estimates that, were federal jurisdiction available, the courts would be flooded
with more than 50,000 projected filings, and more than 13,000 cases reaching
the federal courtS.41 Champions of this remedy therefore attempted to persuade
groups of judges to retreat from their strident opposition. After members of a
special committee of the United States Judicial Conference met with
proponents of the legislation, the federal judiciary shifted from its express
38. But see Vern Countryman, Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The Chief Justice,
the Judicial Conference, and the Legislative Process, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. I (1985). The assumption
that judges do not participate needs to be revised in light of the increasingly active role that judicial
organizations are playing in legislatures. See generally Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The
Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L. REv. 223 (2003); Judith Resnik, The
Programmatic Judiciary: Lobbying, Judging, and Invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, 74 S.
CAL. L. REv. 269 (2000).
39. See Violence Against Women: Victims ofthe System, Hearings on S. 15 Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 102d Congo 314-17 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Violence Against Women Hearing]
(statement of Hon. Vincent L. McKusick, President, Conference of Chief Justices). The statement
claimed: "it can be anticipated that this right will be invoked as a bargaining tool within the context of
divorce negotiations and add a major complicating factor to an environment which is often acrimonious
as it is." Further, "It should be noted that the very nature of marriage as a sexual union raises the
possibility that every form of violence can be interpreted as gender-motivated." Id.
40. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice's 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, THE
THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1992, at 1,3.
41. 1991 Violence Against Women Hearing, supra note 39, 102d Congo at 10, 15-16. The Office of
Judicial Impact Assessment within the Administrative Office of the United States Courts concluded that
the Act's "annual cost to the Judiciary ... would exceed $62.5 million and [cause] 691 work years." Id.
at 15-16. A subsequent report revised the estimate to $44 million and 450 work years. OFFICE OF
JUDICIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL IMPACT STATEMENT:
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT OF 1991, S. 15 AS REPORTED 2 (rev. Jan 8, 1992). Another estimate
was $81 million and 922 work years. OFFICE OF JUDICIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT, ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL IMPACT STATEMENT: VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT OF 1991, S. 15 AS
REPORTED I (rev. June 8, 1992).
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opposition to the Civil Rights Remedy to official silence, and recorded its
support for other features of the bill, such as educational programs.42
In 1994, a compromise statute was passed-providing millions of dollars
in funding for state and tribal programs related to violence against women,
money for shelters and educational programs, means to enforce restraining
orders, criminal penalties for crossing state lines to harm "an intimate partner"
already protected by a valid state domestic relations order,43 and its "Civil
Rights Remedy" for those individuals who were victims of violence. In
response to the judicial critics, the 1994 version of the Civil Rights Remedy
was written to protect persons from "crimes of violence motivated by gender,"
in turn defined as acts "committed because of gender or on the basis of gender,
and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender.',44 The
revised statute borrowed language familiar from the struggles over the meaning
of the right to be free from racial discrimination. The word "animus," found in
civil rights remedies pursued under post-Civil War statutes,45 was added to
invoke both the traditions and the limitations that had become encrusted about
it. According to the statute's sponsors, the new text narrowed the purview of
the federal civil rights remedy so that not all violence against women but only
an unspecified subset-proven to be motivated by "animus based on the
victim's gender"-would find its way into federal court.46 Further, the statute
barred using the Civil Rights Remedy as a basis to bring other claims.47 As
enacted, the statute authorized federal judges to draw distinctions among the
kinds of violence and to find federal civil rights causes of action only for those
in which the victim could demonstrate that such violence was based on animus,
motivated by gender bias.
III. BOUNDING JUSTICE BY REFUSING NATIONAL POSSffiILITIES
As enacted, VAWA was unmistakably a compromise on many fronts and
in some respects a victory of a very traditional sort. Its provisions for
significant funding to state and local police and prosecutorial authorities had
attracted pork-barrel proponents, and its focus on crime made it politically
42. See 1993 REpORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
28.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 2262 (2003).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d) and (d)(I) (1994).
45. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 101, 101-02 (1971) (holding that 42 U.S.c. § 1983(5)
remedies are only available for actions arising from "invidiously discriminatory animus").
46. See Nourse, supra note 28, at 28-32; S. REp. No. 103-138, at 64 (1993) (describing the animus
requirement as requiring a plaintiff to show that a defendant had a "specific intent or purpose, based on
the victim's gender, to injure the victim"). See generally J. Rebekka S. Bonner, Note,
Reconceptualizing VAWA's "Animus" for Rape in States' Emerging Post-VA WA Civil Rights
Legislation, 111 YALE L.J. 1417,1419 n.l0, 1422-27 (2002) (describing the narrowing purpose behind
YAWA's "animus" language).
47. 42 U.S.C. § I3981 (e)(4) (1994).
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popular. Bipartisan supporters on both local and national levels had signed on.
Academics interested in what is termed political economy could well use
VAWA's structure as a basis for analyzing how monetary incentives and anti-
crime agendas shape coalitions to bring about legislative change.
The wisdom of that compromise-and of the underlying effort to create
federal court enforcement through a civil rights remedy and criminal
sanctions-has been debated. Some commentators argued that its model was
tuo exclusive, providing relief only for those with the resources to make their
way into federal court.48 Others regretted that it was shaped as a lawsuit
against assailants and not against states themselves.49 Yet others, worried that
men of color would be disproportionately pursued under the criminal
provisions of the legislation, saw it as unresponsive to a range of women
fearing violence but also fearing unfair treatment by local authorities.50
Moreover, an analysis of the media discussion of the enactment details how its
cumbersome tenn-"gender-motivated" violence-did not flow readily into
popular parlance; much of the public discussion of the legislation focused on it
as a provision about "rape" rather than about "civil rightS.,,51
For those who worried either about having done too little or chosen the
wrong route, the six-year litigating life of the Civil Rights Remedy does not
provide much solace. Despite judges' fears of a flood of cases, only about fifty
published decisions on the Civil Rights Remedy were reported in the federal
courts during the statute's short life (from 1994 until the spring of 2000).52 Of
those cases, about forty-five percent involved allegations of violence in
commercial or educational settings.53 Further, in several of these reported
decisions, the claim of violations of VAWA was coupled with claims of
violations of Title Vn54-suggesting that a few lawyers working on
discrimination in employment and in education had relied on VAWA to
48. See. e.g., Rivera, supra note 37, at 498-502.
49. A proposed revision, suggested after the Court struck the civil rights remedy in VAWA, would
have given a broader mandate. See Violence Against Women Civil Rights Restoration Act, H.R. 429,
107th Cong., 1st Sess. (200 I) (providing a cause of action when offenses have a connection to interstate
commerce, and also providing that the Attorney General would have the discretion to bring lawsuits
against states or localities if patterns of discrimination existed in investigating and prosecuting gender-
related crimes).
50. See Nourse, supra note 28, at 6 n.23, 34 (describing the American Civil Liberties Union's
opposition to the Civil Rights Remedy).
51. See Sarah F. Russell, Covering Women and Violence: Media Coverage of VAWA's Civil Rights
Remedy, 10 MICH. J. GENDER & L. (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript on file with author).
52. See Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 13-15, Morrison (Nos.
99-5,99-29) 1999 WL 1032805 [hereinafter Law Professors' Brief] (describing some of these cases and
the data developed as of the fall of 2000). I was one of several law professors who wrote that brief.
Other data searches found additional cases. See Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL.
L. REv. 121 (2001).
53. Law Professors' Brief, supra note 52, at 13. Those data were developed by Jaw students at
Georgetown and Yale, working with Vicki Jackson, Reva Siegel, and myself.
54. See. e.g., Braden v. Piggly Wiggly, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (M.D. Ala. 1998); Crisonino v. New
York City Hous. Auth., 985 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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supplement other claims. The small number and the kind of claims did not
fulfill proponents' hopes that the Civil Rights Remedy would provide access to
federal courts for those otherwise unable to make their way there.
But despite the many compromises that limited the reach of the legislation,
the symbolic aspects proved of great moment-suggesting that its contributions
cannot only be calculated on the basis of the number of cases filed or won. The
Civil Rights Remedy in VAWA attracted a great deal of attention,55 indicating
that its advocates had breached some boundary that resulted in deep and
emotional opposition.56 Reflective of the shift in attitudes towards women's
rights in general, critics of VAWA did not question the concept that women
had rights to safety. Instead, critics of VAWA shaped their attack on
jurisdictional grounds, that Congress had wrongly invaded the province of the
states in violation of principles of federalism. 57 Challengers argued that
Congress lacked the power to name violence against women as about equality
and commercial capacity and lacked the power to classify the harm as a "civil
right" that federal judges could enforce. While many trial courts rebuffed such
attacks,58 in 2002, a five-person majority of the United States Supreme Court
agreed with the challengers and held that Congress had no authority under
either its Article I Commerce Clause powers or the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution to confer such a
right.
That decision, United States v. Morrison,59 is one of a series of Supreme
Court rulings, all 5-4, that, beginning in the 1990s, have narrowed
congressional authority.60 Morrison is part of a national debate about power,
played out in United States constitutional terms through the concepts of
"separation of powers" (allocations between the branches of the federal
government and specifically here between the Court and Congress) and
55. See Russell, supra note 51.
56. See Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820, 896 (4th Cir. 1999) (en bane) ("The
present controversy is a highly charged one.... Section 13981 scales the last redoubt of state
government-the regulation ofdomestic relations.") (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring).
57. Id. at 842-43, 896. See also William H. Rehnquist, Criteria for Federal Jurisdiction Needs To
Be Preserved in Assessing Proposed Legislation, ST.-FED. JUD. OBSERVER, Feb. 1999, at 2; William H.
Rehnquist, Remarks at Monday Afternoon Session, in AM. LAW INST., 75TH ANNUAL MEETING:
REMARKS AND ADDRESSES, May 11-14, 1998, at 13-19 (commenting that the statute probably violated
"traditional principles of federalism").
58. See. e.g., Doe v. Mercer, 37 F. Supp. 2d 64, (D. Mass. 1999); Timm v. Delong, 59 F. Supp. 2d
944 (D. Neb. 1998); Crisonino v. New York City Hous. Auth., 985 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.V. 1997); Doe
v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375 (N.D. Iowa 1997). According to one count, seventeen of eighteen district
courts upheld VAWA against such challenges. See Jil L. Martin, Note, United States v. Morrison:
Federalism Against the Will ofthe States, 32 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 243,297, n. 410 (2000).
59. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
60. See, e.g., Board Of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. Of Regents, 528 U.S.
62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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"federalism" (allocations between state and federal systems).61 As the majority
in Morrison explained, "The Constitution requires a distinction between what is
truly national and what is truly local.,,62 What is "truly national" was not
violence against women, which we were told, had insufficient relationship to
the economy to support legislation by Congress under its Commerce Clause
powers and insufficient relationship to state action to support legislation
through the Equal Protection Clause. Under this formulation, violence against
women is deemed a feature of private life, not public action and not commerce.
Violence against women is seen as a regrettable, if under-regulated, feature of
family life but not a problem central to the national juridical agenda.
The response of unconstitutionality has teeth (or legs?) because the
argument for limiting powers of government is linked to claims of personal
liberty and autonomy. Thus, persons describing themselves as feminists
reported being "tom" about the decision; while concerned about domestic
violence, they also feared large, impersonal government.63 Such claims echo
old battles, not of the Seven Virtues against the Seven Vices, but rather of
competing virtues against each other. Here, ostensibly, liberty is pitted against
equality on that grounds that, if Congress is recognized as having power to
redress this form of inequality, Congress could use those same powers to limit
other forms ofpersonal expression.64
But, as Reva Siegel and Sally Goldfarb have powerfully documented, the
liberty of some persons has been valued over others. Judges used family
"privacy" as a justification for declining to protect women's physical safety
from their husbands.65 Further, if the liberty of people-and particularly of
women-were today paramount, few of the contemporary restrictions on the
lives of women and men receiving federal benefits under the 1996 welfare act
61. See generally Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction. Gender and the Globe, III
YALE L.J. 619 (2002); Robert Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, II 0 YALE L. J. 441 (2000).
62. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18.
63. See. e.g., Wendy Kaminer, Sexual Congress, AM. PROSPECf, Feb. 14,2000, at 89.
64. Opposition to federal public accommodations provisions took a similar shape. National rights
to use hotels and restaurants and to rent housing were seen as intrusive on personal choices of
association. See. e.g., Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights of Persons within the
Jurisdiction of the United States. Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 88th Congo 2397 (May, June, July, and Aug. 1963) (Statement of Hon. C.c. Aycock,
Lieutenant Governor of Louisiana) (objecting to the "[c]entral government ... dictat[ing] to the
individual citizen the persons with whom he must associate or the manner in which he must use his
property or what individuals he can or cannot serve at his place of business"). Moreover, opponents
argued, were public accomodation laws to be enacted, laws might also address one's ''private club" and
from there, one's dining room and then one's bedroom. See Hearings on S. 1732 Before the S. Comm.
on Commerce, 88th Congo at 436 (statement of George Wallace, then governor of Alabama) at 349-50
(statement of Sam H. Hicks, businessman from Missouri), and at 420 (statement of Ross Barnett,
Governor of Mississippi). See generally LEsLIE CARROTHERS, THE PUBLIC ACCOMODATIONS LAWS OF
1964: ARGUMENTS, ISSUES, AND ATTITUDES IN ALEGAL DEBATE (1968).
65. Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule ofLove": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J.
2117 (1996); Sally F. Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the Persistence ofPrivacy, 61 OHIO Sr.
LJ. I (2000).
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pass muster. 66 But a long history of federal superintendence of impoverished
recipients of federal benefits makes the exercise of federal powers over
beneficiaries seem less "unnatural" than the exercise of federal powers to
question the power of men over women. Federal protection of women's
physical safety was in fact an inventive expression of a newer understanding:
that women's personal safety is a form of freedom which governments ought to
protect.67 However cribbed in practice, the Civil Rights Remedy in VAWA
had great symbolic import as a pronouncement by the national legislature
committing high-powered national actors (federal prosecutors and judges) to
spend their time recognizing women as protected from physical intrusion aimed
at them because they were women.
IV. ENGENDERING JURISDICTION AND JURISDICTIONAL HIERARCHIES
In centuries past, some jurists expressly said that women's bodies were not
much protected by law.68 But by the end of the twentieth century, lawmakers
in democracies had largely rejected that idea. Rather, opposition to the Civil
Rights Remedy of VAWA was predicated on the view that, while violence
against women was bad, it was unnatural for responses to such violence to be
located within the rubric of civil rights through federal legislation and federal
adjudication. Opponents placed violence against women as fitting within-and
perhaps cutting across-other legal categories: torts, criminal law, family law.69
Further (went the argument), tort law, criminal law, and family law were
categories that belonged to state, not federal, governance. In short, the debate
about the Civil Rights Remedy was on the substance of its jurisdictional
propriety, which in tum had symbolic resonance.
Let me make plain the stakes. For many, discussions of jurisdiction
suggest unappealing forays into technically arcane delineations. But in the
United States, state and federal court jurisdiction is drenched in politics.
During the first two centuries of its existence, jurisdictional divides between
states and the federal government were the means of enabling slavery. During
the twentieth century, access to the federal courts became one route by which
66. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). See generally LINDA GoRDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE
MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE 1890-1935 (1994); Gwendolyn Mink, Violating Women:
Rights Abuses in the Welfare Police State, 577 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 79 (2001).
67. See Resnik, Categorical Federalism, supra note 61, at 639-42.
68. Siegel, supra note 65, at 2122-29 (detailing the historical common law right of husbands to
engage in marital "chastisement").
69. See Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820, 843 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc) ("Section
13981 also sharply curtails the States' responsibility for regulating the relationships between family
members by abrogating interspousal and intrafamily tort immunity, the marital rape exemption, and
other defenses ....").
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African-Americans escaped hostile state legal regimes. Ov'er the last half
century, the phrase "don't make a federal case out of it,,70entered popular
parlance and illustrates some of what turns on access to the federal courts. "A
federal case" means an important case, giving litigants the ability to bring
claims before federal judges, seen in some eras as hospitable to rightseekers.
Moreover, in this federation, the jurisdictional divide between state and
federal courts is gender-coded,71 infused with associations that identify women
with families, define women's legal issues as problems of families and
violence, and locate disputes about such issues within the jurisdiction of state
courts. While some readers may hesitate before sharing the assumption of
jurisdiction as gendered, most will be comfortable with a parallel claim: that
jurisdictions have hierarchies, and that, in this country, federal jurisdiction is
assumed to be a mark of a matter's import. Therefore, to refuse to permit
something to become a federal case is to relegate it to a somewhat lesser
stature, as about local-as contrasted with national-legal requirements.
For those not steeped in the nuances of the constitutional law of the federal
courts, a basic proposition bears reiterating. Federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction, rather than courts with a general charter to entertain any and all
sorts of claims. Article III of the Constitution lists several kinds of cases to
which "the judicial power" shall extend and, by implication, constricts
congressional authority to provide grants of jurisdiction beyond those
parameters.72 However, within the set of permitted cases are those "arising
under" federal law.73 As long as Congress passes statutes that it has the
constitutional power to enact by virtue of Article I or of other constitutional
provisions, federal courts can have the power to hear the cases flowing from
such statutes. Therefore, while Congress may not have unlimited options, its
power over interstate commerce and its power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment are substantial. Those powers could, if legislators and judges so
desired, be understood as sufficient to sustain the jurisdiction of federal courts
to recognize women and men as holding the right to be free from violence that
undermines their ability to walk, work, or live as equals.
On more than a dozen occasions over the last forty years, members of
Congress have tried to do so. They have proposed legislation to establish civil
or criminal causes of action that would have deployed federal judges to enforce
70. See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error. Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning ofArticle
lJI, 113 HARV. L. REv. 924,981 (2000) (detailing the history and usage of the phrase), See also ERIC
PARTRIDGE, A DICTIONARY OF CATCH PHRASES 52 (1977) (defining the phrase's colloquial American
meaning as "Don't exaggerate the importance of something. Don't exaggerate the seriousness of my
action...."); Martin Guggenheim, State Intervention in the Family: Don't Make a Federal Case Out of
It, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 399 (1984) (detailing how procedural doctrines bar access to federal court).
71. That institutions come with such a valence is explored by Joan Acker. See, e.g., Joan Acker,
Class, Gender, and the Relations ofDistribution, 13 SIGNS 473 (1988); Joan Acker, Hierarchies, Jobs,
and Bodies: A Theory ofGendered Organizations, 4 GENDER & SOC'Y 139 (1990).
72. U.S. CONST. art. III, cl. 2.
73. Id.
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provIsions responsive to the disruptions, both economic and physical,
stemming from the dissolution of families. The bills took different shapes,
sometimes aimed at facilitating support orders by the registration of state
judgments in federal courts, sometimes proposing criminal sanctions, and
sometimes creating new civil remedies. For example, in the Child Support
Recovery Act of 1992, Congress endorsed the use of federal courts in criminal
proceedings against "deadbeat dads.,,74 Plainly, the Civil Rights Remedy in
VAWA also represented congressional views that such jurisdictional grants
were proper. But not all federal judges-and most significantly five members
of the Supreme Court-agreed.
My interest is in how federal jurisdiction came to be understood as
inappropriate for redressing violence against women. Why was it plausible for
the majority ruling in Morrison to rely on images of the "truly national" and the
"truly local" and to place VAWA's Civil Rights Remedy on the wrong side of
that line? The underlying facts of the Morrison litigation had nothing to do
with families or even local crime. A young woman at college, assaulted by
fellow students, filed a federal VAWA claim after the college reneged on its
sanctions against the students.75 She alleged that one assailant had bragged that
he liked to get women drunk and then to rape them.76 Her case seemed to fit
the problems proffered by VAWA's supporters, who had provided Congress
with evidence of the effects of violence on women's work and education, as
well as on their safety at home. The risk of violence formed a barrier to
women's free engagement in a range of commercial activities. 77 Proponents
had also supplied detailed studies of how states failed to guarantee women
victims of violence equal protection of the law.78
74. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994), amended by Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-187,112 Stat. 618.
75. See Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820, 827 (4th Cir. 1999) (en bane).
76. More graphic descriptions are provided in the district court opinion. See Brzonkala v. Va.
Polytechnic Inst., 935 F. Supp. 779, 784 (W.O. Va. 1999) (quoting the allegations that one of the
assailants said "I like to get girls drunk and fuck the shit out of them.").
77. See, e.g., 1991 Violence Against Women Hearing, supra note 39, 102d Congo at 239041
(Statement of Elizabeth Athanasakos, National President, National Federation of Business and
Professional Women, Inc.); S. REp. No. 103-138, at 54 n.70 (1993).
In the I960s, the Supreme Court concluded that congressional power over interstate commerce
included enacting legislation to lower "barriers" to commerce. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (upholding the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as
applied to desegregation of motels on that ground: "Thus the power of Congress to promote interstate
commerce also includes the power to regulate the local incidents thereof, including local activities in
both the States of origin and destination, which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon that
commerce."). Victoria Nourse, who worked on VAWA as a member of Senator Joseph Biden's staff,
has argued that the evidence of violence against women serving as a barrier to women's participation in
commercial activity, as developed in the legislative record of VAWA, was stronger than the records
before the Supreme Court in decisions such as Heart ofAtlanta Motel. See Victoria Nourse, Toward A
New Anatomy of Constitutional Structure 40-45 (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
78. Justice Souter's dissent in Morrison listed the studies of gender bias that Congress considered
when enacting VAWA. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 631 n.7 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Given this background, what gave federal jurists the ability to place
violence against women within the rubric of local crime control and family
life? How could they rely on the idea that federal court jurisdiction was
somehow naturally, essentially, inappropriate for this form of litigation? How
were these assumptions about jurisdictional boundaries formed? The answers
come from the interactions between Congress, courts, the academy, and
political movements, linking certain kinds of claims with federal and state
governance. Over the course of the twentieth century, both Congress and the
federal judiciary identified "the federal courts" as the national stage on which
to place civil rights. In the 1950s, Brown v. Board ofEducation stamped the
federal judiciary as an institution committed to equality. Thereafter, during the
1960s, Congress deepened that impression by creating a series of civil rights
remedies enforceable in federal courts. At the same time, Congress also
authorized jurisdiction for a host of other statutory claims, some involving
securities, antitrust, and environmental rights, others about labor and patent
law, some focused on criminal sanctions.
Federal dockets increased, and federal judges responded by fmding ways to
increase their numbers, add assistants, and reformulate procedures.79 Over
time, federal judges began to develop their own conceptions of what cases
ought to be committed to their courts and to tell Congress not to send certain
kinds of cases their way. Time and again, members of the federal judiciary
have marshalled their resources and, through a small leadership body called the
Judicial Conference of the United States, used the name of the Article III
judiciary to oppose congressional efforts to create new federal rights aimed at
safeguarding women physically and economically. While they have not always
succeeded, they have stifled efforts to innovate and to confer rights on women
to challenge status hierarchies.
To be specific, in 1957, when considering proposed legislation to register
orders requiring parents (virtually always fathers) who had left one state to
avoid supporting children or former spouses in another, members of a
committee of the federal judiciary commented that, although "convinced that
there [was] need for some legislation," it would be "unnecessary" and "unwise"
to provide for "enforcement" in federal courts. 80 Nine times between 1957 and
1992, the Judicial Conference advised Congress not to enact bills to provide for
federal court assistance in the enforcement of support orders across state
lines. 81 Three times between 1981 and 1996, the Judicial Conference recorded
79. See generally Judith Resnik, "Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice": Inventing the District
Courts of the Twentieth Century for the District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 607 (2002);
Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 70.
80. 1957 ANNUAL REpORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 27.
81. See 1957 ANNUAL REpORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 37; 1959 ANNUAL REpORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES 35, 316-17; 1963 REpORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
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concerns about proposals related to federal jurisdiction over disputes stenuning
from child custody orders.82 In 1986, faced with the proposed ratification by
Congress of an international treaty-the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction-the federal judiciary opposed the bill to the
extent that it provided for state and federal courts to have concurrent
OF THE UNITED STATES 73; 1965 REpORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 17, 63; 1967 REpORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 2\, 68-69; 1971 REpORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 80; 1977 REpORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 53; 1992 REpORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 57.
The bills differed somewhat. Many related directly to child support orders. But one provision, in
1977, would have created a "federal right for every unemancipated child to be supported by" that child's
parents. See 1977 REpORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 53 (opposing that proposal and commenting that "such legislation in establishing a federal right
to support could have a substantial impact upon the workload of the federal judiciary."). The bill, H.R.
6196, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), had been introduced by members of Congress who described their
effort as reflecting the "natural, moral, social and Federal right to be supported" by one's parents. In
light of national patterns of migration, some dependent children had been "left behind." Because states
lacked the ability to enforce support rights, proponents sought to create a federal means of enforcing
state support efforts and to include a substantive federal right as well.
82. In 1981, a bill was introduced to grant jurisdiction to the district courts to enforce any custody
order of a state court against a parent, who in contravention of such order, took a child to another state.
See H.R. 223, 97th Congo (1981). The Judicial Conference commented:
While the bi1l embodies a matter of policy for Congressional determination, the Committee
concluded that Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution may not support such a grant of
jurisdiction to a Federal court; historically jurisdiction in domestic relations cases as been
reserved to state courts. Further, the bill is unclear as to questions of venue, what law is to be
applied, and the nature of the relief to be granted. The conference in March of 1978 took no
position (p. II) on the merits of a similar bill, but authorized the communication of the
Committee's views to the Congress. The Conference therefore approved transmission of the
Committee's views on HR 223 to Congress.
See 1981 REpORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 65.
In 1989, after the Supreme Court had interpreted a federal statute involving kidnapping not to
create a private right of action in federal court, the A.B.A. considered suggestions to seek legislation to
create such a right expressly. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988) (holding that the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 does not provide a federal cause of action). The Judicial
Conference objected. See 1989 REpORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 64 ("The Judicial Conference opposed the overruling of Thompson .... Such
legislation would constitute an unnecessary expansion of federal jurisdiction into areas in which federal
courts have no expertise and would result in unnecessary federal-state conflicts.").
In 1995, a proposal, the Child Custody Reform Act of 1995, S. 632, 104th Congress, 1st Sess., was
made to amend the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USC § 1738A, to establish
"uniform standards for resolving child custody jurisdiction between states." The bill would have
continued jurisdiction of the state court that made initial custody decisions, established an enhanced
locator system to track proceedings, and expressed the "sense of the Senate" that local governments
should use block grants to protect visitation from being violent. The Judicial Conference warned against
this proposal:
Although neither the PKPA nor the legislation currently implicates the federal courts, efforts
are being made to amend the bi1l or other legislative proposals to create federal jurisdiction in
this area. The Judicial Conference previously opposed similar legislation, noting that it
"would constitute an unnecessary expansion of federal jurisdiction into areas in which federal
courts have no expertise and could result in unnecessary federal-state conflicts" (see 1989
Judicial Conference Report at 64). At this session, the Conference, on recommendation of
the Committee, reaffirmed its position opposing legislation to create a federal cause of action
to resolve conflicts between states on the issue of jurisdiction over child custody disputes.
The Conference also emphasized confidence in the state courts' ability to resolve such
disputes and supported the effort of the Conference of Chief Justices to address the problem
of conflict on interstate child custody disputes.
1996 REpORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 20.
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jurisdiction over litigation under the convention.83 Further, as noted, in 1991
the judiciary initially objected to early drafts of VAWA.84 The judiciary has
also counseled against other statutes related to issues identified with violence
against women and children.85
Earlier in the century, as the federal judiciary was becoming more
organized and developing its corporate voice, some of its members worried
about their institutional role as judges. They cautioned against taking positions
on its own jurisdictional boundaries. For example, in the early 1930s, one
member of the Judicial Conference commented: "to express ourselves on
contemplated legislation to grant or to withdraw jurisdiction from the Federal
Courts- . .. it seems to me to be rather presumptive on our part, if we
undertake it officially.,,86
Through the decades, some judges have viewed commentary on pending
new statutory causes of action as ill-advised. But, as illustrated by federal
judicial opposition to family support and anti-violence provisions, other judges,
concerned about the volume and believing that Congress was crafting too many
and some of the "wrong kind" of federal rights, pressed the Judicial Conference
to take positions against the specific proposals detailed above. 87 They
83. 1986 REpORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 12.
The purpose of the legislation, according to one of its sponsors, Jack Brooks of Texas, was to deter the
"removal of children from the United States to foreign countries in order to obstruct parental rights."
Included was a new federal felony for "violation of state parental kidnapping statutes." Sponsors
argued that state prosecutors lacked funds to extradite violators. The act, to enable pursuit and
extradition by federal officials, was passed, and in 1988, the term "kidnapping" in international
extradition treaties was extended to apply to parental kidnapping. See Extradition Treaties
Interpretation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 105-323,112 Stat. 3033.
84. See 1991 REpORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 57 ("The Conference agrees with the State Chief Justices that the current broad definition of
crime (applicable, for example, to misdemeanors and other minor threats against persons and property)
creates a right that will be invoked as a bargaining tool within the context of divorce negotiations and
add another major complicating factor to an environment which is often acrimonious as it is.") .
85. For example, the Conference objected to the Pornography Victims Compensation Act. See
1990 REpORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 18 (stating
that, "insofar as it would provide a right of action for victims of violent crime against producers and
distributors of sexually explicit materials in certain circumstances" in federal court, ... the "subject
matter of the legislation falls within the traditional scope of state law, and there is no need for actions in
the federal courts to vindicate federal interests or policies").
86. See 1932 Transcript 237A, in Records Related to Judicial Conference Meetings, 1922-1958, at
Box 8 (Judge Alschuler). Materials from the Senior Conference of Chief Justices (which then became
the Judicial Conference of the United States) can be found at the National Archives in Washington, D.C.
These materials are catalogued under Record Group (RG) 116, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts,
and then by "entry" and the number of "containers" (or boxes). Within each of the many file boxes are
transcripts, memoranda, reports, notes, and correspondence, not always kept in a uniform manner.
"Records Related to Judicial Conference Meetings, 1922-1958" is the title of Entry 4, a collection of 83
boxes.
87. The history is rich and complex, as, over the eighty years of existence, the Conference took
different approaches toward commenting on proposals to create new federal rights. See Resnik,
Constricting Remedies, supra note 38; Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 70. By 1995, under the
leadership of the current Chief Justice, the Judicial Conference approved a Long Range Plan, urging
Congress to create presumptions against new federal rights if enforced in federal courts. JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS (1995),
reproduced in 166 F.R.D. 49, 88-89 (1996) [hereinafter loNG RANGE PLAN] (Recommendation 6).
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produced a solid wall of opposition to legislation providing federal court
enforcement of interstate family obligations and to legislation relating to the
physical safety of children and of women inside households and within or
fleeing from dissolving families.
Through deliberate and largely successful efforts to dissuade Congress
from providing jurisdiction, federal courts did not decide such cases. From the
descriptive, the prescriptive emerged: that federal courts ought not decide such
cases. That view gained constitutional stature in Morrison-enshrining the
proposition as a constitutional prohibition.
Federal judges also expressed a sense of their distance from women's lives
in families in other ways. During the 1960s and 1970s, as women's rights
activists brought claims of unequal treatment to courts, they found some of the
pain of discrimination in those very places-the courts. In 1980, two fledgling
organizations, the National Association of Women Judges and the National
Organization of Women Legal Defense and Education Fund created a new
project: The National Judicial Education Project to Promote Equality of
Women and Men in the CourtS.88 Its purpose was to educate judges about their
own stereotypes.
"Gender bias in the courts" became the shorthand, as gender bias task
forces were launched in dozens of states. In the late 1980s, some women and
men thought it time to start parallel efforts in the federal courts. Formal
requests were made to an official commission, the Federal Courts Study
Committee, that Congress chartered to map the future of the federal courtS.89
That Committee, comprised of jurists and lawyers, issued a report in 1990,
which amidst a myriad of recommendations, rejected the request to support
federal task force work akin to that ongoing in the states. As the Report
explained, "studies in many state systems reflect the presence of bias-
particularly gender bias-in state judicial proceedings." Yet, "we have
confidence that the quality of the federal bench and the nature of federal law
keep such problems to a minimum.,,9o While educational programs were useful
and vigilance was important, more was not needed-because of the "nature" of
federal law.
Between the 1950s and 1990s, however, the judiciary was more selective. As for civil rights, the
Conference did not oppose all such legislative efforts. For example, despite some concerns about
workload, the judiciary did not object to the 1964 Civil Rights Act. See 1963 REpORT OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JuDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 74.
88. See Schafran, supra note 35.
89. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, §§ 101-09, 102
Stat. 4642, 4644-46 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 331 note (1988)) (creating committee to "examine problems
and issues currently facing the courts of the United States" and to "develop a long-range plan for the
future of the Federal judiciary").
90. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REpORT 169 (Apr. 2, 1990) [hereinafter FCSC REpORT].
For discussion, see Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction and the Federal
Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1682 (1991).
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How could "the nature of federal law" reduce problems of gender bias?
One possibility is that federal law and federal judges are deeply egalitarian,
thereby avoiding the perils of bias. But the struggles about race discrimination,
played out today in terms of color blindness and a refusal to confront systemic
discriminatory practices within the criminal justice system,91 make that reading
implausible. Rather, something presumed to be essential in the content of state,
as contrasted with federal, jurisdiction was the implicit predicate for the 1990
Federal Courts Study Committee's conclusion.
Therefore, more excavation and translation is needed. Return to the
commentary: "studies in many state systems reflect the presence of bias-
particularly gender bias-in state judicial proceedings." But, "we have
confidence that the quality of the federal bench and the nature of federal law
keep such problems to a minimum.,,92 How does one translate "gender bias"
here? While the term "gender" embraces the social meaning of the roles of
both women and men, in this context, gender bias is equated with bias against
women.93 Consider then how state law could have problems about fair
treatment of women but federal courts would not. To sustain that thesis, one
needs a theory of identity for the different court systems and for the different
ways that women and men would engage with them.
Where are women as litigants in courts? Potentially, they could be
plaintiffs or defendants in civil or criminal cases. However, rather than
classified as workers, politicians, criminals, or citizens, 'women are frequently
viewed through their relationships and categorized by their status as wives,
mothers, daughters. If conflated with roles within families, the principal legal
problems of women can be assumed to stem from family life. (Recall the
argument that some judges made in the early 1990s against the Civil Rights
Remedy in VAWA: that women would use claims of violence strategically to
obtain federal jurisdiction over divorce and child custody disputes.94) The legal
problems of families, in turn, came to be understood as appropriately issues that
state judges-not federal judges--decided. That understanding grew, as I
detailed above, because of efforts by federal judges to avoid dealing with
failing families. Thus, the federal courts gained the veneer of focusing on
national issues, defmed as including commerce and equality but excluding
family life. We can then return to the text of the Federal Courts Study
91. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (rejecting an individual's claim of
discrimination in the decision to sentence him to death, despite statistical evidence that defendants
convicted of killing white victims were four times more likely to be sentenced to death than were
defendants found guilty of killing African-Americans).
92. FCSC REPORT, supra note 90, at 169.
93. During the I 980s, many feminists turned to the word "gender" as a means of underscoring that
distinctions between men and women could not only be understood as an artifact ofnature-"sex"-but
were also social constructions. See JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF HISTORY
(1988); TORIL MOl, SEXUAIJTExTUAL POLITICS: FEMINIST LITERARY THEORY (1985).
94. Supra note 39.
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Committee and understand its tacit assumptions: while problems of gender bias
were extant in state courts, federal courts were not likely to share them because
of the differing composition of the dockets of the two sets of courts.
I have just provided two means-lobbying efforts over forty years and a
major report on federal jurisdiction-by which groups of federal judges and
lawyers expressed their views about what fit within the federal framework and
why certain kinds of "women's issues" fell outside it. I cannot leave this
discussion with the impression that these judges' discomfort with undertaking
lawmaking related to women in and outside of families in fact insulated federal
judges from doing so.
Two empirical points undermine that impression. First, although
statements that family law "belongs" to the states are often made, federal
statutory regimes govern many facets of family life. United States tax law
defines household heads. United States benefits law (welfare, social security)
and bankruptcy law detail family relations and obligation of support.95 United
States pension law governs marital property rights in pensions, which for
certain classes are the largest asset when and if they divorce. And, if daily
headlines about Elian Gonzalez did not make this point clear,96 United States
law defmes families for purposes of immigration and asylum.97 Further, when
Congress affects economic relations between current and/or former marital
partners through social security, Railway Retirement benefits, and employee
benefit plans, the Supreme Court has often found state law-including
community property law-preempted by the force of federal economic policies
relating to flows of income to workers and their spouses.98 Moreover, the
Supreme Court itself is a font of federal family law, developed in cases raising
questions about the constitutionality of state laws on marriage, adoption, and
visitation of children.99 And, of course, women are litigants in many cases
outside their role as actors within families. 100
This description also provides a normative insight: there is no alchemy-of-
equality simply by consigning an arena of law to federal or to state actors. The
substance of the policies--on welfare, tax law, or immigration-mayor may
95. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Bankrupt Children, 86 MINN. L. REv. 1003 (2002).
96. See, e.g., Karen DeYoung, Elian's Competence to Seek Asylum Argued in Hearing; Questions
From Judges Focus on Parents' Rights, What s Best for a Cuban Child, WASH. POST, May 12, 2000, at
A2. See also Alien Unaccompanied Minor Adjustment and Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 505, 107th
Cong., 1st Sess. (proposing to revise procedures for adjustment of immigration status and directing
Attorney General to establish panel of guardians ad litem for unaccompanied minors in INS
proceedings).
97. See Kristin Collins, Note, When Father's Rights are Mothers' Duties: The Failure of Equal
Protection in Miller v. Albright, 109 YALE LJ. 1669 (2000).
98. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex. reI. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141
(2002).
99. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982);
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
100. See generally Elizabeth Warren, What Is a Women's Issue? Bankruptcy, Commercial Law,
and Other Gender-Neutral Topics, 25 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19 (2002).
HeinOnline -- 14 Yale J.L. & Feminism 416 2002
416 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 14: 393
not further equality, depending upon the commitments of a given legal and
political regime. 101 Those commitments do not inhere in definitions of "state"
and "national" but spring from the work of those who seek equality and justice
and who strive to make political systems adopt such commitments.
Second, despite protestations that federal courts did not need to undertake
studies of the effects of gender in their courts, several circuits did tak~ on such
projects. About half the federal circuits had projects on gender, as well as on
race, religion, and ethnicity in the courtS. 102 And subsequently, the Judicial
Conference endorsed such work. 103 Those task forces in tum found that
women who were lawyers and judges working within the federal courts did not
find their gender irrelevant. Rather, significant proportions of women reported
that in different fashions, gender mattered, often to their detriment, as workers
. h' th 104 S d th b' 1 h d l' . 105WIt In e courts. orne reporte at laS a so arme women ItIgants,
In contrast, the percentages of men reporting disadvantage from their gender
were much smaller. 106
Return then to the question about how and why the Civil Rights Remedy of
VAWA was seen as a breach of jurisdictional etiquette. Nature does not make
jurisdiction, but people do. Understanding violence against women as outside
the purview of federal law stems from active efforts by judges, in conjunction
with other political actors, to keep the concept of federal statutory rights and
the work of federal judges from developing national norms of physical safety as
part of the dignitary rights of women and men in the United States. Return also
to the symbolic as well as the substantive harm that flowed from that rejection.
The phrase "don't make a federal case out of it" makes the point that "the
federal" is the mountain, not the molehill.
101. The toleration of gender discrimination in immigration provides one example. See Nguyen v.
INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (upholding a statutory classification varying the time when a child, born
abroad, can apply for citizenship based on whether the child's mother or the child's father was a United
States citizen).
102. See, e.g., THE EFFECfS OF GENDER IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: FINAL REpORT OF THE NINTH
CIRCUIT GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE (July 1993), reprinted in 67 S. CAL. L. REv 745 (1994); REpORT OF
THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON GENDER TO THE D.C. CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON GENDER, RACE, AND
ETHNIC BIAS, reprinted in 84 GEO. LJ. 1657 (1996); REpORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON
EQUAL TREATMENT IN THE COURTS, reprinted in 42 VILL. L. REv. 1355 (1997); FINAL REpORT OF THE
EIGHTH CIRCUIT GENDER FAIRNESS TASK FORCE, reprinted in 31 CREIGHTON L. REv. 9 (1997);
REpORT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON GENDER, RACIAL, AND ETHNIC FAIRNESS IN THE
COURTS, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 9; REpORT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT GENDER, RACE AND ETHNIC BIAS
TASK FORCES, reprinted in 9 B.U. PUB INT. L.J. 173 (2000). See generally Resnik, Asking about
Gender in Courts, supra note 24.
103. LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 87, 166 F.R.D. at 172-74 (Recommendations 78 and 79)
(directing federal courts to investigate and eliminate gender bias and noting that the Ninth Circuit
Gender Bias task force "sets a high standard, one that other courts would do well to emulate").
104. See, e.g., THE EFFECfS OF GENDER, supra note 102, at 949-53.
105. Id. at 832-35; Lilia M. Cortina, Kimberly A. Lonsway, Vicki J. Magley, Leslie V. Freeman,
Linda L. Collinsworth, Mary Hunter, & Louise F. Fitzgerald, What's Gender Got to Do With It?
Incivility in the Federal Courts, 27 LAW & SOc. INQUIRY 235, 244 (2002).
106. See, e.g., THE EFFECfS OF GENDER, supra note 102, at 950.
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V. THE GENDER OF JURISDICTION, AND THE JURISDICTION OF GENDER
By way of conclusion, let me underscore five themes. First, jurisdiction
has gender. Whenever power is being allocated between state and federal
courts, one must ask not only how women are treated but how the allocation
affects our understanding of the problems that belong to women and to men.
By drawing jurisdictional lines, polities may also be drawing gender lines. We
must probe both the jurisdiction in gender, and the gender in jurisdiction.107
Second, I counsel against assuming that any particular jurisdiction is
necessarily a safe harbor for women's equality. Equality is not an artifact of the
level of a court or of a government body but of who has power within it and
what their commitments are. Therefore, I am opposed to what I have termed
"categorical federalism," 108 to rigid equation of any particular level of
governance with a particular set of problems or a particular view of them.
Laws are not unidimensional but often affect many aspects of a person's life.
Opponents of VAWA who wanted to label it a statute about families and about
crime were right to understand that it did implicate family life and street crime.
But they were wrong to see the provision in only those terms. VAWA was also
about the relationships among violence, commerce, and equal citizenship. But
proponents of equal citizenship ought not to assume that national or
transnational legislation could ever suffice to alter the material conditions of
women's lives. They need to look to state as well as national and international
efforts to forward those goals. 109
My third point is to enlarge the frame beyond the arguments that
jurisdictions can become gendered and that jurisdictional divides are one of the
many mechanisms by which women and men are distinguished. Gender
systems are themselves forms of jurisdiction. At its core, the sex/gender
system is a system of boundaries. Many of the successes that have advanced
women's equality have come by reframing understandings of the range of
possibilities of both women and men, by redrawing some boundaries, and by
erasing others. To do so has required detaching assumptions of the naturalness
of differences between women and men and replacing those assumptions with
appreciation for the breadth of capacities that all persons possess.
Feminism has long known that it had much to fix. That women had to
come to terms with the political construction of the family has long been
obvious. That women had to focus on violence has also been readily evident.
What I hope to have shown is that feminism must also take on the conceptual
underpinnings of this federation. We need to understand the assignment of
107. To paraphrase SANDRA G. HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEMINISM (1986).
108. Resnik, Categorical Federalism, supra note 61.
109. After Morrison, many local efforts have been undertaken to create state or municipal
prohibitions against gender-motivated violence. See Resnik, Categorical Federalism, supra note 61, at
643 n.1 01; Russell, supra note 51, at 81-92; Bonner, supra note 46, at 1419-20.
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roles to state, local, and national institutions and to demonstrate the way in
which gender and patriarchal assumptions infuse understandings of the
categories of federalism and of the very meaning of the powers permitted to the
national government. Thus, and fourth, in addition to projects related to
women's work, to violence, and to families, feminists must add questions of
federalism to the list of structures and practices requiring refurbishing. I 10
I began this essay by asking readers to look at a picture. I underscored the
peculiarity of its contemporary capacity to suggest Justice. I hope that, by the
end of this essay, readers also can see the peculiarity of the response of some
jurists, who, when called upon to take into account the inequality produced by
violence against women, responded by talking about the "truly local" and
concluded that the problem was outside the province of federal law. And I also
hope to have illuminated the analytic similarity between essentializing
jurisdiction and essentializing gender.
One fmal return to Renaissance imagery is thus in order. Recall that, in
those many pictures, Justice often had company-Temperance, Prudence, and
Fortitude-friends, companions, and colleagues, who shared in the work of
producing a wise and good social order. Although lost to popular discourse,
that collective still has didactic power. To work successfully to create
women's equality depends upon collaboration-among women, between
women and men, and across levels of government. My impatience and
impudence makes me somewhat skeptical about embracing Temperance or
Prudence. But plainly at least Fortitude is required to bring about the kinds of
transformations needed to undergird a deep and substantive equality, articulated
and enforced-locally, nationally, and transnationally-for women. The
conference's title was Women, Justice and Authority, and we displayed but a
single icon, Justicia, on the brochure. But, when in search of the authority for
women to have justice, one lonely woman's figure is insufficient.
110. As several have done. See METILER, supra note 16; Siegel, supra note 34; Resnik,
"Naturally" Without Gender, supra note 90.
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